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 Executive Summary  
 
On 20 and 21 May 2002, the Illinois Governor’s Terrorism Task Force (ITTF) and the 
University of Illinois Fire Service Institute co-hosted the first statewide homeland security 
summit at the University of Illinois Springfield.  The summit was funded by a grant from 
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Partnership Illinois program and 
developed as a partnership with the ITTF and leaders challenged to develop effective 
homeland security policies and programs at the local, regional, state and national level.    
 
Summit Built Upon Statewide Workshops Post 9/11.  The summit was the 
culmination of two sets of homeland security workshops held throughout Illinois after 
9/11/01.  A series of public information workshops sponsored by Governor Ryan and the 
ITTF were held in November 01 to provide immediate information to the public and local 
officials about programs in place and resources available to them to respond to a 
homeland security event.  In February-May 02 under a University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign Partnership Illinois grant, the Illinois Fire Service Institute in partnership with 
local officials and the ITTF organized and conducted 18 Homeland Security Planning 
Workshops (HSPW) throughout Illinois. 
 
Summit Attendees from Nine Critical Groups. These workshops brought together a 
cross section of officials at all levels of government and from the private sector.  This 
process revealed that there are at least nine critical groups who must work together to 
create and implement effective homeland security policies and programs. One of the 
most important outcomes of the summit was to identify these groups and bring key 
individuals from each group together to begin a process of interagency cooperation.  The 
groups are: 
1. Elected and appointed government officials 
2. Fire service  
3. Law enforcement 
4. Public and private health 
5. Emergency management 
6. Public and private works 
7. School officials and educators 
8. Private sector 
9. Non-government aid organizations 
Summit participants were selected from individuals who had participated in the HSPW 
workshops and who represented all nine groups and all regions in Illinois. 
 
Summit Objectives: The central goal of the summit was to bring together local, 
regional, state and federal homeland security policymakers, first responders, and 
leaders in Illinois representing the nine critical groups to: 
 Develop a statement of the “State of Homeland Security in Illinois” relative to key 
issues. 
 Make policy and program recommendations that can be taken at the local, 
regional, state and national levels to improve homeland security in Illinois. 
 
Summit Issues: Numerous homeland security issues were identified during the regional 
HSPW workshops and during the discussions at the summit.  The following issues were 
identified as affecting Homeland Security in Illinois and served as the basis for the 
development of the summit program: 
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  Command, control, communications 
 Incident command 
 Defining regional response 
 Equipment and resources 
 Exercises & training 
 Funding 
 Information exchange, intelligence / threat analysis and research 
 Interagency cooperation 
 Legislation 
 Mutual aid and regional / statewide response teams 
 Notification and alert system 
 Public information / media 
 Roles and responsibilities – defining 
 
State of Homeland Security (HS) in Illinois 
 
The overall state of homeland security in Illinois is good at the state government level, in 
the city of Chicago, and selected regional areas; however, many local communities are 
not yet engaged in active planning.    Summit participant response identified different 
“states” at three levels of homeland security. 
 
1. Strategic. (Broad Policy Leadership) Because of the creation of the Illinois Terrorism 
Task Force in 2000, state, local, regional and federal officials have had an 
interagency coordinating forum for homeland security in Illinois.  The ITTF has 
provided critical leadership, centralized management and an open forum to develop 
and implement synergistic HS efforts in Illinois.  Participants reported that on a 
strategic level: 
• This is not the “center of gravity of thinking” in most communities. 
• State and City of Chicago are “solid.”   
• Several Regions “solid.”   
• Statewide Mutual Aid growing.  
• Most regions just starting strategic planning process.   
• Significant local concern for sustained “funding.”   
• Elected and other key leader buy-in is critical.   
 
2. Operational (Interagency Coordination and Cooperation).  The ITTF has brought 
together key state, regional and local first response organizations who have updated 
existing state and regional plans to include homeland security operational response 
plans and processes.  
• Consequence management (response) has been the focus of effort.   
• State Emergency Actions Plan (EAP) provides a coordinated response base.  
• Chicago and some regional emergency management organizations have 
developed an effective ability to coordinate HS response.   
• Statewide Mutual Aid is available for fire response but requires development in 
other first response areas.   
• Regional / multi-jurisdictional coordination is limited.   
• Nine critical groups not all participating in the HS planning process.   
• Systems for managing volunteers must be developed.   
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 3. Tactical (Ability to perform specific critical homeland security tasks).  The focus of 
most HS thinking at the local level is on consequence management tasks. 
• Homeland security threats are Human + BNICE + Cyber.    
• State Tactical Teams are available but not in all skills and not in all localities.   
• Many communities depend on outside assistance to meet HS threats.   
• Adequate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is not available to all first 
responders.  
• Keys to better tactical response postures are staffing, training, equipping, 
incident command, coordinated interagency response, and sustained 
funding. 
 
First Response Tiers 
One of the central homeland security goals identified by summit participants was for 
Illinois to develop a set of tier-based standards for each region and to work to meet 
those standards.  Force capability “Tiers” can be characterized as follows: 
 
• Tier 1 (Immediate 1st On-Scene response) 
- Local 
- Immediate response 
- Limited capabilities 
• Tier 2 (Defensive Containment) 
- Local & regional mutual aid 
- Augment 1st response 
- Special tools, equipment and expertise  
• Tier 3 (Offensive Remediation Capability) 
- Local & regional & Statewide mutual aid 
- Response may be 1-6 hours after dispatched 
- Technician level special tools, equipment and expertise  
• Tier 4 (Federal Response) 
- Interstate and Federal agency-based 
- Delayed up to 72 hours pending activation and federal approval 
- May provide Technician level special tools, equipment and expertise 
or may only focus on federal responsibilities 
 
Recommendations for the Way Ahead 
Seven Threats and Seven Critical Elements to Protect and Enable First Response 
. 
Seven threat elements are identified as the basis for homeland security response known 
as Human + BNICE + Cyber: (1) Human threat, (2) Biological, (3) Nuclear / 
Radiological, (4) Incendiary, (5) Chemical, (6) Explosive, and (7) Cyber {against 
information, web services, data systems, etc.}.  At least seven critical elements were 
then distilled from summit discussions as essential for first responders to operate 
effectively and safely against these seven threats during a HS event.  
 
1. Pre-event Intelligence Fusion and Information Exchange.   
2. Adequate Staffing.   
3. Knowledge.   
4. Detection.   
5. Unified Incident Command.   
6. Specialized Equipment.   
7. Inter-agency Response.  
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 Homeland Security Challenges 
Homeland security (HS) is a local first response problem that may also demand 
immediate federal response (as in the case of 9/11/01 where local first responders 
retained incident command at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and in 
Pennsylvania, while the federal government immediately ordered all aircraft grounded 
and established combat air patrols over key cities and mobilized national support to 
reinforce local efforts).  Throughout the Summit, discussion identified the challenges that 
must be overcome in order to create an effective, integrated local-regional-state-federal 
homeland security structure.  Taken together, these challenges define the requirement 
to make homeland security, prevention, emergency preparedness and response a 
continuing priority for local, state and federal funding, staffing, training and investment.  
These challenges include: 
• Illinois is a large and diverse state.  How to support regional response?  
• Regional Partnership Development. Connecting nine Critical Groups.   
• Prevention and Preemption must also be a priority.  
• “What do I do?”  Most citizens simply do not know what to do in response to a 
homeland security event. 
• Bio Threat.  Responding to a biological / clinical discovery is a critical challenge.  
• Leadership.  Local elected officials must become more involved. 
• Sustained, Long-term Funding.  Sustained funding is critical.   
• Training must be standardized, performance-based and available to nine critical 
groups and the public. 
• Common system of Unified Command is critical.  
• Interoperable, statewide communications system is critical.   
• Information Clearinghouse and Common Terminology are required.   
• Standards. How to identify, establish relevant, performance-based, interoperable 
standards for response, training, equipment, staffing and interagency cooperation. 
• Technology.  How to identify, acquire, disseminate, and train first responders to 
employ appropriate technology required to mitigate a BNICE / WMD threat. 
• Credentialing.  How to create a credentialing system for first responders, 
responsible officials, participants throughout the response chain and volunteers. 
• Defining Roles and Responsibilities.  Define who has the authority and expertise 
to be responsible for planning, responding and directing the interagency prevention 
and response effort against each of the seven threats (Human + BNICE + Cyber). 
• Managing Volunteers.  How to educate, document, credential, support and 
establish a system to get individuals with requisite skills, where and when they are 
needed and keep all others outside of the critical crisis area. 
• HS Alert System.  An integrated federal-state-local system is needed that tells 
individuals and communities what they need to do to plan and respond to threat 
warnings and react to a catastrophic HS event. 
• Understanding the business-end of HS/EP.  Insurance costs, shared 
response/mutual aid, joint purchasing of equipment, personnel costs.  
• Turnover.   Turnover amongst key decision makers and highly trained first 
responders is a reality that requires continuous training and team building. 
• Apathy.  “This cannot happen here” is a significant hurdle to overcome among 
elected leaders, key community leaders (both public and private) and the general 
public. 
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 Homeland Security Recommendations 
 
Overarching Recommendations. 
Summit participants provided a substantial set of positive, action-oriented 
recommendations across the spectrum of issues discussed.  They saw the desired 
outcomes for homeland security in Illinois as creating an integrated system to prevent 
and respond to HS events.  This concept redefines the federal terms associated with 
Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD) of Crisis Response and Consequence 
Management.  There was significant discussion and agreement that prevention and 
response are the appropriate terms and foci.  All nine critical groups must be engaged 
to make homeland security work in Illinois (elected officials, fire, law enforcement, 
public/private health, emergency management, public/private works, educators, private 
sector, and non-government organizations). Key actions recommended to be taken to 
improve Illinois’ homeland security posture include: 
 
• Define roles and responsibilities of key decision makers and response organizations.   
- Operational-Level.   
- Policy-Level.   
- Local/State vs. Federal.   
• Sustained Funding.  
• Balance focus between Consequence Management and Prevention/ Preemption / 
Preemption Investment.    
• Engage public and private policy makers in HS planning and response preparations. 
• Integrate educators, private sector and non-government organizations.  
• Establish a HS rewards and recognition system. 
• Provide planning templates to local communities. 
• Develop / Expand statewide mutual aid. 
• Mandate HS training.  
• Develop a statewide HS Information Clearinghouse.  
• Establish a system of Common Incident Command (inter-disciplinary & inter-
jurisdictional).   
• Standardize training, equipment, terminology, response, and incident command. 
 
Regional Response Criteria 
A strong central theme was the development of a set of criteria for defining “what was a 
region” as a basis for developing Regional Response.  The ITTF should initiate an 
assessment / planning effort to define current and desired capabilities in each region.  
Summit participants emphasized that “one-size does not fit all;” therefore, planning must 
accommodate local / regional differences.  Summit participants defined six criteria for 
regional response: 
 
1. Build on population centers. 
2. Build on existing state and regional response organizational divisions. 
3. Build on the existing technical and specialist local regional and state response 
teams. 
4. Define and protect critical infrastructure. 
5. Define and meet minimum response times. 
6. Define and provide in-depth, overlapping / secondary / tertiary regional and 






























 Illinois Homeland Security Summit 
 
 
On 20 and 21 May 2002, the Illinois Governor’s Terrorism Task Force (ITTF) and the 
University of Illinois Fire Service Institute co-hosted the first statewide homeland security 
summit at the University of Illinois Springfield.  The summit was funded by a grant from 
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Partnership Illinois program and 
developed as a partnership with the ITTF and leaders challenged to develop effective 
homeland security policies and programs at the local, regional, state and national level.    
 
Local, State and National Strategic Planning Efforts Prior to 9/11/01.  On May 16, 
2000, Governor George Ryan signed Executive Order Number 10, creating the Illinois 
Terrorism Task Force (ITTF). Under the direction of Matt Bettenhausen (Illinois Deputy 
Governor for Public Safety and Illinois State Director for Homeland Security), Michael 
Chamness (Director, Illinois Emergency Management Agency), and Doug Brown (Illinois 
State Police 1st Deputy Director}, the Task Force has provided an on-going interagency 
forum to develop Homeland Security policies and to direct state efforts toward planning, 
preparation and response to terrorism in Illinois.  One of the clear lessons of September 
11, 2001 has been that local actions are critical to protect Illinois citizens against 
terrorism.  Terrorist events and threats in the U.S. will be local and will require local 
leadership and resources.  Local response and recovery plans must be prepared and 
exercised before a terrorist event and these plans should envision actions that can be 
taken to prevent or even preempt a terrorist attack.   The Homeland Security Summit 
was held to assist in this effort. 
 
Summit Built Upon Statewide Workshops Post 9/11.  The summit was the 
culmination of two sets of homeland security regional seminars and workshops held 
throughout Illinois after 9/11/01.  The first series of 16 regional seminars were held in 
November 2001 sponsored by Governor Ryan and the ITTF to provide immediate 
information to the public and local officials about programs in place and resources 
available to them to respond to a homeland security event.  In February-May 02 under a 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Partnership Illinois grant, the Illinois Fire 
Service Institute organized and conducted 18 Homeland Security Planning Workshops 
(HSPW) throughout Illinois in partnership with local officials and the following ITTF 
member organizations: Illinois Emergency Management Agency, Illinois Department of 
Public Health, Illinois State Police, Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards 
Board, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety and Office of the State Fire Marshal.   
 
Summit Attendees from Nine Critical Groups. These workshops brought together a 
cross section of officials at all levels of government and from the private sector.  This 
process revealed that there are at least nine critical groups who must work together to 
create and implement effective homeland security policies and programs. One of the 
most important outcomes of the summit was to identify these groups and bring key 
individuals from each group together to begin a process of interagency cooperation.  The 
groups are: 
1. Elected and appointed government officials 
2. Fire service  
3. Law enforcement 
4. Public and private health 
5. Emergency management 
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 6. Public and private works 
7. School officials and educators 
8. Private sector 
9. Non-government aid organizations 
Summit participants were selected from individuals who had participated in the HSPW 
workshops and who represented all nine groups and all regions in Illinois. 
 
Summit Objectives Summit Objectives: The central goal of the summit was to bring 
together local, regional, state and federal homeland security policymakers, first 
responders, and leaders in Illinois representing the nine critical groups to: 
 Develop a statement of the “State of Homeland Security in Illinois” relative to key 
issues. 
 Make policy and program recommendations that can be taken at the local, 
regional, state and national level to improve homeland security in Illinois. 
 
Summit Issues: Numerous homeland security issues were identified during the regional 
HSPW workshops and during the discussions at the summit.  The following issues were 
identified as affecting Homeland Security in Illinois and served as the basis for the 
development of the summit program: 
 Command, control, communications 
 Incident command 
 Defining regional response 
 Equipment and resources 
 Exercises 
 Funding 
 Information exchange, intelligence / threat analysis and research 
 Interagency cooperation 
 Legislation 
 Mutual Aid and regional / statewide response teams 
 Notification and alert system 
 Public information / media 




20 May 2002 
 11:30 AM – 12:30 PM  Registration  
 12:30 – 1:45 PM  Opening session, welcome, keynote speeches 
 2:00 – 5:00 PM  Functional working group discussions 
 5:00 – 6:30 PM  Break, individuals may check into hotels 
 6:30 – 8:30 PM  Dinner and after dinner speech 
21 May 02 
 8:30 AM – 12:00 PM  Issue working group discussions  
 12:00- 1:00 PM  Lunch 
 1:00 – 4:30 PM  Issue working group report-outs 
 4:30 – 5:00 PM  Summit conclusion 






 Summit Process 
 
Keynote Speeches.   
 
Illinois Homeland Security Coordinator.  Illinois Homeland Security Coordinator and 
Deputy Governor for Public Safety Matt Bettenhausen “kicked-off” the summit with a 
charge to the attendees to collaborate to develop policy recommendations that can 
be implemented to continue the efforts already begun to improve Illinois homeland 
security.  He noted that: 
• In the next year substantial federal resources are promised, 80% will be 
passed through to local communities.  Such investment must be made in 
ways that improve homeland security posture and response in regional sets.  
A central question for participants is how to build and define standards 
for regional response as a basis for this investment. 
• He noted that many common themes had already been developed from the 
homeland security planning workshops. 
• He noted that Illinois has already taken a leadership role among US states in 
its homeland security preparations and that he and Governor Ryan routinely 
dialogue with Governor Ridge and the White House Homeland Security staff. 
• He charged participants to provide their input on how to best address their 
HS concerns in order to continue to improve Illinois’ homeland security 
posture.  
 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region V Director.  Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region V Director Ed Buikema followed 
with a similar charge.  FEMA Region V coordinates federal emergency management 
response for the six-state mid-west region (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Ohio, and Wisconsin).  He emphasized the lessons learned and federal efforts to: 
• Share intelligence. 
• Manage volunteers 
• Assist in critical infrastructure protection. 
• Ensure continuity of operations during/following a catastrophic HS event. 
 
Intra-Discipline Discussion Period.  Following the keynotes, participants met by 
functional groups to address the issues from an intra-disciplinary perspective.   A key 
goal was to establish the current state of homeland security in Illinois from each 
discipline’s perspective and to identify key functional issues to serve as the basis for 
inter-discipline discussions on day two. 
 
Dinner and Evening Keynote.  The evening of Day one a dinner was held and 
participants were seated according to the inter-disciplinary discussions groups to 
which they would be assigned on Day two.  Illinois Fire Service Institute Director 
Richard Jaehne spoke on the parallels between the interagency planning demands 
of homeland security and those he found while participating in an operation to protect 
the American Embassy in Beirut during the height of the Lebanese civil war in the 
later 1980’s. 
 
Inter-discipline Discussion Period.  The morning of Day two, participants from each 
of the nine discipline groups were assigned to each of the issue discussion groups.    
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 Discussion Group Reports and Dialogue.  Following issue discussions, all summit 
participants met to receive and discuss issue group reports.  Dialogue on critical 
aspects that included all participants was led by Summit Director Jaehne.  At the 
conclusion of the reports, Deputy Governor Bettenhausen (who had been present 
throughout the reports) summarized and thanked the participants and charged them 
to continue to work to address the issues discussed and to improve HS in Illinois. 
 
Regional Summit Participation:  Working with Fire Departments around the state 
regional sites were designated prior to the summit to permit anyone who was unable to 
attend the Summit in Springfield to provide their input on the issues. Input was received 
from three regional sites and the input from these groups was provided to summit 
participants and included in this report 
 
State of Homeland Security in Illinois 
 
The overall state of homeland security in Illinois is good at the state government level, in 
the city of Chicago, and selected regional areas; however, many local communities are 
not yet engaged in active planning.    Summit participant response identified different 
states at three levels of homeland security. 
 
1. Strategic. (Broad policy leadership)  Because of the creation of the Illinois Terrorism 
Task Force in 2000, state, local, regional and federal officials have had an 
interagency coordinating forum for homeland security in Illinois.  Participants 
reported that on a strategic level: 
• Strategic policy is not the “center of gravity of thinking” in most communities. 
• State and City of Chicago are “solid.”  The State of Illinois and the City of 
Chicago have taken specific actions that have significantly improved the ability of 
state agencies to respond to a homeland security event and to assist local 
communities. 
• Several Regions “solid.”  Regionally several areas have also taken positive steps 
to improve their homeland security posture.  For example, Lake County, DuPage 
County, and Springfield have received and invested federal homeland security 
funds.   
• Statewide Mutual Aid Growing.  Implementation of the Mutual Aid Box Alarm 
System (MABAS) as a statewide mutual aid system for fire service response has 
also had an important positive impact on other first response organizations to 
create similar systems. 
• Most regions just starting strategic planning process.  Most regions have just 
begun to develop a strategic planning process post 9/11.  For example, 85% of 
Illinois counties completed the federally-sponsored county-wide assessment 
process by Fall 2001.  
• Significant local concern for sustained “funding.”  There is significant local 
concern about the sustainability of state and federal funding to underwrite the 
added costs of implementing and maintaining homeland security programs at the 
local level. 
• Buy-in is critical.  Buy-in by elected officials and community leaders is absolutely 
critical for the development of an effective strategic planning process and 
sustained policy implementation. 
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 2.  Operational (Interagency Coordination and Cooperation).  The ITTF has brought 
together key state, regional and local first response organizations who have updated 
existing state and regional plans to include homeland security operational response 
plans and processes.  
• Consequence management focus.  The focus of operational thinking is on 
actions to improve consequence management (incident response) rather than on 
crisis management (incident prevention). 
• State Emergency Actions Plan (EAP) provides coordinated response base. The 
Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) has updated and used the State 
Emergency Actions Plan (EAP) and Emergency Operations Center (EOC) with 
forward command posts to coordinate interagency response throughout Illinois.  
This structure was used on 9/11/01 and serves as the basis for homeland 
security operational-level response. 
• Chicago and some regional Emergency Management Offices have an effective 
ability to coordinate response.  The City of Chicago, and several regional 
emergency management organizations have implemented similar coordination 
processes and have an effective ability to coordinate response.  
• Statewide Mutual Aid is available for fire response.  The MABAS system provides 
a statewide mutual aid system for fire service response and assures that 
whatever level of assistance required by a fire department to manage and 
respond to an incident can be made available in an orderly and timely response.  
Similar systems are required of other first response communities. 
• Regional / multi-jurisdictional coordination limited.  The ability to coordinate 
regional and multi-jurisdictional events runs from well planned and modestly 
equipped, to marginally or unprepared. 
• Nine critical groups not all participating.  Several of the nine critical groups are 
not integrated into local interagency planning and response organizations for 
planning and response.  In particular local school officials, private sector and 
local volunteer organizations. 
• Systems for Managing Volunteers Required.  Volunteers are a potential concern.  
During a major incident unsolicited volunteers and donations have historically 
inundated incident commanders.  A system of credentialing and managing 
volunteers and donations must be created. 
 
3.   Tactical (Ability to perform specific critical homeland security tasks).  The focus of 
most homeland security thinking is at the local level on consequence management. 
• Homeland security threats are Human + BNICE + Cyber.  Tactical threats posed 
by homeland security are human + biological, nuclear, incendiary, chemical, 
explosive and cyber (Human + BNICE + Cyber). 
• State Tactical Teams are available but not in all skills and not in all localities.  
Tactical specialist teams exist in HAZMAT, technical rescue, nuclear response, 
bomb squads, public health laboratories, etc.; however, they are concentrated in 
the Chicago metropolitan area and in communities that have been able to make 
the investment with local resources.  Many communities and regions have no 
locally available technical specialist response teams. 
• Dependence on outside assistance.  Many communities depend upon technical 
specialists from well outside their region to manage and respond to an incident. 
• Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) not available to all first responders. The 
personal protective equipment of the first responders varies from meeting 
national standards to unprotected.  Standard first responder personal protective 
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 equipment is not effective against all potential WMD threats, requiring investment 
in new PPE such as gas masks. 
• Keys to better tactical response postures.  Key focus areas to improve tactical 
response are staffing, training, equipping, incident command, coordinated 
interagency response, and sustained funding. 
 
First Response Tiers 
 
Another perspective of the state of Illinois homeland security is time vs. capabilities of 
first responders to a HS event.  Time is the enemy of all first responders as they attempt 
to respond to and mitigate the consequences of a catastrophic homeland security event.  
The first challenge is the immediate response that occurs in the first minutes of the crisis 
to conduct immediate life saving, identify the threat/contamination and call for required 
assistance (Tier 1).  As the response grows in size and capability, first responders 
expand life saving, and rescue efforts and seek to contain the catastrophic effects of the 
event (Tier 2), in effect they are trying to “catch up” with the event.  Finally, as 
specialized teams and equipment arrive, action can be taken to reduce and eliminate the 
threat (Tier 3), in effect “getting ahead” of the crisis.   Federal response forces, beyond 
those routinely positioned in the geographic area of the event, are often delayed up to 72 
hours.  Even when deployed, they operate in parallel with the local, regional and state 
forces, with the exception of specific FEMA-directed inter-state and private assets.  
Force capability can be characterized as follows: 
 
• Tier 1 (Immediate 1st on-scene response) 
- Local 
- Immediate response 
- Limited capabilities 
• Tier 2 (Defensive Containment) 
- Local & regional mutual aid 
- Augment 1st response 
- Special tools, equipment and expertise  
• Tier 3 (Offensive Remediation Capability) 
- Local & regional & Statewide mutual aid 
- Response may be 1-6 hours after dispatched 
- Technician level special tools, equipment and expertise  
• Tier 4 (Federal Response) 
- Interstate and Federal agency 
- Delayed up to 72 hours pending activation and federal approval 
- May only focus on federal responsibilities or may provide technician 
level special tools, equipment and expertise 
 
The current state and challenge identified by summit participants was that capabilities at 
each tier 1, 2 and 3 levels are inadequate in any one area to meet the complete 
response requirements of a catastrophic event.  Some 1st responders, such as law 
enforcement, lacked clear legal authority for inter-jurisdictional mutual aid.  One of the 
state homeland security central goals identified by recipients was for Illinois to 
develop a set of tier-based standards for each region and to work to meet those 
standards. 
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 Recommendations for the Way Ahead 
 
Seven Threats and Seven Critical Elements to Protect and Enable First 
Response 
. 
Seven threat elements are identified as the basis for homeland security response known 
as Human+ BNICE+ Cyber: (1) Human threat, (2) Biological, (3) Nuclear / radiological, 
(4) Incendiary, (5) Chemical, (6) Explosive, and (7) Cyber against information and data 
systems.  At least seven elements were distilled from summit discussions as essential 
for first responders to operate effectively and safely against these seven threats at a 
catastrophic HS event.  
 
1. Pre-event Intelligence Fusion and Information Exchange.  The homeland 
security environment is dynamic involving nefarious human efforts and constantly 
evolving Human + BNICE + Cyber threats.  A robust, inclusive system of intelligence 
fusion and dissemination of threat response advisories are essential to help first 
responders prevent, preempt and respond to a threat / incident. 
 
2. Adequate Staffing.  Effective, safe response depends upon having adequate 
numbers of appropriately trained and equipped responders at every point in the 
response chain.    
 
3. Knowledge.  First responders must be trained to recognize and implement protocols 
when facing a BNICE and human threat.  They must know what threat environments 
in which they, their personal protective equipment (PPE), and equipment are capable 
of operating, and when they must retreat and call for higher levels of capability. 
 
4. Detection.  First responders require immediate detection of BNICE threat 
contaminants that will allow them to identify the threat they are facing, implement 
appropriate protocols and quickly establish the Hot, Warm and Cold zones.  This 
must include the entire evidence/sample chain from collection, to on-scene sensors, 
to laboratory analysis and reporting back to the incident commander. 
 
5. Unified Incident Command.  Incident command, coordination and direction must be 
established on three levels:  (1) Local incident command, (2) unified command for 
direction and synchronization of the interagency operation, (3) convening of a team 
to support policy decisions by the senior elected official must all be established at the 
earliest possible time in a catastrophic event.  Together this command chain must 
control operations, request, receive and employ additional response assets, and 
inform as a means to engage the public. 
 
6. Specialized Equipment.  Catastrophic Human, BNICE, and Cyber events require 
tailored technology and specialized interoperable equipment to permit first 
responders to act to mitigate the consequences of the event.  
 
7. Inter-agency Response.  No single agency has the ability to respond to or mitigate 
a catastrophic HS event, yet, day-to-day first response agencies tend to operate 
individually rather than jointly.  Interagency cooperation and response must become 
the way first responders operate. 
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 Homeland Security Challenges 
 
Homeland security (HS) is a local first response problem that may also demand 
immediate federal response (as in the case of 9/11/01 where local first responders 
retained incident command at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and in 
Pennsylvania, while the federal government immediately ordered all aircraft grounded 
and established combat air patrols over key cities and mobilized national support to 
reinforce local efforts).  Throughout the Summit, discussion identified the challenges that 
must be overcome in order to create an effective, integrated local-regional-state-federal 
homeland security structure.  Taken together, these challenges define the requirement 
to make homeland security, prevention, emergency preparedness and response a 
continuing priority for local, state and federal funding, staffing, training and investment.  
These challenges include: 
 
• Illinois is a large and diverse state – how to define regional response?   
Homeland security response must be diverse and responsive to local needs to be 
effective.  There are thousands of units of government and agencies that must help 
implement HS.  Local response depends upon local responders and immediate regional 
support, yet some 1st responders lack clear legal authority for inter-jurisdictional mutual 
aid.   We must create a system to deploy needed assets from throughout the state to the 
crisis area and bridge the capability and response gaps between metro, urban and rural 
areas and between full-time, part-time and volunteer first responders. 
 
• Regional Partnership Development – Connecting nine critical groups.  
Developing interagency partnerships within each region of the state that include all nine 
key “stakeholder” groups is essential for homeland security development. 
 
• Prevention and Preemption.  Actions taken before an event that can prevent, 
preempt and better prepare responders to respond are not in balance with the same 
energy and commitment that is being applied to building response (consequence 
management) structures.  Intelligence sharing, fusion, time-sensitive analysis and 
action-oriented alert notification are all challenges to overcome.  
 
• “What do I do?”  Public education and engagement programs are essential to 
assist the public in becoming part of the solution.  Most citizens simply do not know what 
to do in response to a homeland security event. 
 
• Bio Threat.  Responding to a biological / clinical discovery is a significant challenge.  
Issues include: quarantine, food-chain-based threat, timely detection and confirmation of 
the agent, preventative medical prophylaxis, reception and onward movement of national 
and state pharmaceutical stockpiles, public-private hospital coordination, and defining 
who’s-in-charge.   
 
• Leadership.  Local elected officials must become more involved (mayors, townships 
and county elected leadership).  Key elected, appointed and private sector leaders must 
be engaged in the process and “lead by example” in proactive engagement. 
 
• Sustained, Long-term Funding.  Sustained funding is critical.  While the Illinois 
Governor and State Legislature cooperated for a one-time $17 million homeland security 
investment in early 2002, sputtering economies and the sheer magnitude of the required 
HS investment demand federal funding and sustained investment in homeland security 
at each level of government and in the private sector, as well.  Prioritized public-private 
investment is also essential. 
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 • Training.  Establishing a system of standardized, performance-based training that 
ensures all first responders, key decision makers, as well as, 2nd responders from the 
nine critical groups have received requisite training is critical.   Availability of time by paid 
and volunteer responders is the great enemy of access to training.  The ITTF-approved 
strategic Training Plan must continue to evolve to create performance-based standards, 
common curriculum, and mandated training for critical response teams. 
 
• Unified Incident Command.  A common system of unified command is critical to 
effective interagency response.  Must include 3 levels – incident command, unified 
command and EOC. 
 
• Interoperable Communications System.  How to create a statewide, locally 
accessible, interoperable, communications system for all first responders. 
 
• Information Clearinghouse and Common Language.  There is a critical need to 
establish a common mechanism to provide for an exchange of reliable, current 
information on the full spectrum of critical HS issues; interalia, training, response 
protocols, threats, technology, and equipment.  At the same time common 
understanding of key terminology and concepts is critical. 
 
• Standards.  How to identify, establish and implement meaningful, performance-
based, interoperable standards for response, training, equipment, staffing and 
interagency cooperation. 
 
• Technology.  How to identify, acquire, disseminate, and train first responders to 
employ appropriate, standardized equipment required to operate against and mitigate 
Human +  BNICE + Cyber threats. 
 
• Credentialing.  How to create a system of credentialing for first responders, 
responsible officials, participants throughout the response chain and volunteers to 
ensure that individuals are registered, skills certified and a system of responder scene 
control can be immediately established in a crisis. 
 
• Defining Roles and Responsibilities.  How to establish a system to define who has 
the authority and expertise to be responsible for planning, responding and directing the 
interagency prevention and response effort against each of the seven threats (Human + 
BNICE + Cyber). 
 
• Managing Volunteers.  How to educate, document, credential, support and 
establish a system to get individuals with requisite skills, where and when they are 
needed and keep all others outside of the critical crisis area. 
 
• HS Alert System.  An integrated federal-state-local system is needed that tells 
individuals and communities what they need to do to plan, respond to threat warnings 
and react to a catastrophic HS event. 
 
• Understanding the business-end of Homeland Security. Issues such as 
insurance costs, shared response/mutual aid, joint purchasing of equipment, personnel 
costs – additional staffing and overtime to attend training, how to finance HS efforts, etc.   
 
• Turnover.   Turnover amongst key decision makers and highly trained first 
responders is a reality that requires continuous training and team building just to 
maintain effective homeland security response. 
 
• Apathy that “this cannot happen here” is a significant hurdle to overcome among 
elected leaders, key community leaders (both public and private) and the general public. 
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Summit participants provided a substantial set of positive, action-oriented 
recommendations across the spectrum of issues discussed.  They identified the desired 
outcomes for homeland security in Illinois as creating an integrated system to prevent 
and respond to HS events.  This redefines the federal terms associated with 
Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD) of Crisis Response and Consequence 
Management.  All nine critical groups must be engaged to make homeland security 
work in Illinois (elected officials, fire, law enforcement, public/private health, emergency 
management, public/private works, educators, private sector, and non-government 
organizations). Key actions recommended to improve Illinois’ homeland security posture 
include: 
 
• Define roles and responsibilities of key decision makers and response organizations.  
Participants asked that the ITTF provide a template applicable statewide for specific 
roles and responsibilities for the “way we do business.”   
 
- Operational-Level.  It was recommended that the RAE concept be implemented 
at the operational / incident command level. (The RAE concept provides that the 
individual/organization with requisite Responsibility, Authority and Expertise 
takes the lead operationally, e.g., bomb-squad in an explosive incident, etc.).   
 
- Policy-Level.  Who is in charge at the policy level is established in law as the 
locally elected official.  This person must understand his/her responsibilities.  A 
system must be established  for elected officials to educate other elected 
officials on their responsibilities and assist them in executing them. A 
comprehensive list of groups and associations who can assist in communicating 
with these officials should be assembled in order to identify those who can 
Help. 
 
- Local/State vs. Federal.  HS planning and incidents are a local problem that 
requires local/region/state coordinated efforts.  Federal authorities have specific 
responsibilities that overlap in limited specific areas that must be coordinated 
with local planning; however, plans must be based on the reality that federal 
authorities will seldom, if ever, take complete control / responsibility for a local 
domestic incident. 
 
• Funding. One-time investments in equipment, training and infrastructure are 
preferred for investment over additional staffing that carries with it significant local 
costs (taxes and benefits add some 35% additional local tax and benefit costs)  HS is 
a sustained new mission that requires sustained new funding.  Programs must be 
legislatively mandated both at the federal and state level to be sustained.  Funding 
should be performance-based. 
 
• Balance focus between Consequence Management and Prevention/ Preemption / 
Preemption Investment.   The ITTF must be structured to provide both prevention / 
preemption and consequence management focus.  There must be a unified response, 
rather than independent separate responses.    
 




• Integrate educators, private sector and non-government organizations in the HS 
planning and preparation effort.   
 
• Establish a HS Rewards and Recognition system for public and private individuals, 
local, state and federal organizations. 
  
• Provide planning templates based upon local incident management to local, regional, 
state and federal response organizations. 
 
• Mutual Aid.  Develop / Expand statewide mutual aid building upon the MABAS (fire 
service Mutual Aid Box Alarm System) model.  
 
• Mandate HS training to establish the curriculum required for all HS responders and 
decision makers and require selected training and performance-based testing for 
response teams operating in the Hot and Warm zones and for incident command teams. 
 
• Develop a statewide HS Information Clearinghouse.  We need a commonly 
understood place from which to draw HS information. 
 
• Establish a system of Common Incident Command.  HS is a local incident command 
problem.  Mandate Unified Command standard for disaster and local, regional and state 
agencies HS response.  Implement the RAE concept (Responsibility, Authority, 
Expertise) to establish who is in charge of a particular type threat.  This system must 
provide for shifting command and roles as the incident develops and include all nine 
critical groups. 
 
• Standardize training, equipment, terminology, response, incident command. 
 
Regional Response Criteria 
A strong central theme was the development of a set of criteria for defining a region as a 
basis for developing Regional Response.  The ITTF should initiate an assessment / 
planning effort to define current and desired capabilities in each region.  Summit 
participants emphasized that “one-size does not fit all;” therefore, planning must 
accommodate local / regional differences.  Summit participants defined six criteria for 
regional response: 
 
1. Build on population centers. 
 
2. Build on existing state and regional response organizational divisions. 
 
3. Build on the existing technical and specialist local regional and state response 
teams. 
 
4. Define and protect critical infrastructure. 
 
5. Define and meet minimum response times. 
 
6. Define and provide in-depth, overlapping / secondary / tertiary regional and 
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 Recommendations by Discussion Issue 
   Indicates Action Taken to Implement by the Illinois Terrorism Task Force 
 
Communications. 
   Focus on both technology and human communications interoperability. 
 Establish a statewide high-speed network for HS response. 
   Establish common HS terminology. 
   Establish a unified communications system to support incident unified command;  
      e.g., frequency spectrum management, interoperable equipment, interagency  
      communications protocols, common terminology, secure capability, etc.   
   Link local, regional and state communications with federal communications system.  
      Procure frequency-sharing black boxes and make available regionally. 
 Establish statewide 911 and reverse 911 coverage. 
 Protect the radio frequencies for first response. 
 Establish statewide emergency response cellular phone coverage. 
 
Elected Officials 
  Initiate efforts by elected officials to help educate other elected officials to become 
engaged in HS planning and preparation efforts. 
   Make it simple for elected officials to become involved in HS. 
 Train elected officials on how to manage a HS crisis, on media relations and public 
information. 
 
Equipment and resources 
   ITTF develop a statewide-standardized HS equipment list. 
   ITTF baseline capabilities, and prioritize investment. 
   Provide for maintenance and replacement of critical HS equipment. 
 
Exercises and Training 
   Provide standardized training for all disciplines. 
  The goal should be to train all first responders to the operational terrorism level in  
accordance with the state terrorism-training plan.  “This is the right goal.” 
   Establish a statewide database of training information. 
   Ensure training integrates private and public sectors. 
   Review and where necessary establish a set of agreed state performance standards 
for technician-level Human + BNICE + Cyber threat response teams; e.g., bomb, 
SWAT, HAZMAT, technical rescue, emergency medical, etc. 
 Establish a survey system to define best-practices worldwide (federal program with 
state and local participation).  





   HS funding requires a paradigm shift in funding that makes HS a sustained new 
      mission.  “We have to be together and not create independent, separate responses.”   
   One-time investments in equipment, training and infrastructure are preferred for  
      investment over additional staffing that carries with it significant local costs (taxes   
      and benefits add some 35% additional local tax and benefit costs). 
 Unfunded mandates are a concern.  Funding programs must provide for the tax and  
benefit costs of additional staff, repair and replacement of grant funded equipment  
and supplies, and training of replacement personnel.  
   Take legislative action to ensure sustained funding for HS. 
   “Free” training is not free unless overtime costs are also paid.  Provide funding for  
      overtime for selected first responders to attend critical training. 
 Establish a system to baseline communities to determine their contribution to HS. 
 Establish a state self-insurance pool for disasters. 
   Establish a system to permit reimbursement of private sector organizations that 
      provide incident response assistance. 
 “There is already substantial local investment in many communities and the state is 
looking at reducing tax / revenue / sales tax sharing with local communities.”  The 
state should continue to fund local governments at current levels or better for HS.  
 Continue Illinois State funding for HS investment. 
   Continue to fund consequence management through the emergency management 
      system; however, the ITTF should also provide resources to develop prevention and 
      preemption programs. 
 
Incident Command. 
   Establish an Interagency committee to oversee unified command that establishes  
the standard for how we do unified command in Illinois. 
 Use the state standard curriculum ICS/Unified Command (ICS/UC) to train and 
exercise ICS/UC for all nine critical groups. 
 Mandate Unified Command standard statewide and required attendance at unified 
command training by first responders and selected key personnel from the nine 
critical groups for disaster and HS response local, regional and state agencies.  
   Implement the RAE concept (Responsibility, Authority, Expertise) to establish who is  
      in charge of a particular type threat.  This system must provide for shifting command  
      and roles as the incident develops and include all nine critical groups. 
   Expand availability and use of graphic information system (GIS) for planning and  
      incident command. 
   Improve the ability of local incident commanders to integrate federal response when  
     deployed to a local incident (top-down and bottom up). 
 
Interagency cooperation 
  Create and distribute a local handbook / planning template. 
 
Legislation 
 Conduct an interagency effort to review and update statutes, as required to provide 
requisite authority and long-term resources. 




 Mutual aid and regional / statewide response teams 
   Develop / Expand statewide mutual aid building upon the MABAS (fire service 
      Mutual Aid Box Alarm System) model.  Emergency management, public health and  
      law enforcement should all develop mutual aid systems. 
   Develop a list of standardized equipment. 
   Conduct a regional current capabilities assessment to define the baseline for each  
      region. 
 Provide for reciprocity and credentialing across agencies, across communities and 
state-lines. 
   Establish interdisciplinary regional mutual aid teams available for statewide  
deployment. 
   Review and revise statutes to permit inter-jurisdictional mutual aid for all first  
      responders. 
 
Notification and alert system 
   Create a standardized statewide alert and warning system and mandate city and  
county emergency operations plans to include terrorism / HS plans.   
 Establish a system to develop regional HS plans based upon the 18+ HS regions. 
   Action plans for both the public and nine critical groups need to be developed  
with discrete actions for each level of alert. 
 Develop a list of public and private best practices worldwide. 
   Develop a trusted agent network to disseminate sensitive information quickly.  
      Two concepts required: 
- Individuals empowered to receive and fuse together sensitive information; i.e., 
security clearances and interagency fusion centers.  
- Individuals empowered to take appropriate action; e.g., Los Angeles County 
Terrorist Early warning Group. 
   Develop multiple, integrated approaches to alert and warning. 
 Mandate HS alert system response curriculum be taught in public schools.  
 Define who has the legal authority to compel citizens to act in a crisis; e.g., 
quarantine. 
   Establish a program, as part of the establishment of the alert system, that teaches 
      citizens what the HS hazards and indicators are and what they should do  
      in response. 
 
Prevention, Preemption, Intelligence / threat analysis and research 
   Make pre-crisis prevention, preemption and intelligence fusion & sharing a priority for  
resources and effort. 
   Initiate a system of active HS surveillance. 
 
Public Engagement. 
 Re-energize civil defense programs to educate and empower citizens to prevent / 
preempt / and respond appropriately in a HS event.  This must be a long-term effort. 
  Define HS and the risks that citizens face as the basis for the public engagement  
education program. 
   Educate the public on HS using multiple alternate means; e.g., web, public 
service announcements, courses, etc. 
   Educate key associations, elected and appointed officials of the importance of public  




   Establish a standardized message and program that teaches citizens what the 
HS hazards and indicators are and what they should do in response. 
 Establish a system to vet and credential volunteers based upon their capabilities. 
 Establish a school-based public information program similar to fire and all-risk 
prevention and safety programs. 
 Ensure workers in each of the nine critical groups are trained and empowered to 
assist in this public education/engagement effort. 
 Create citizen HS academies. 
 Establish volunteer registration as part of the driver’s license processing system. 
 Establish senior advisor councils to identify and harness expertise at the local, 
regional and state level available for HS planning and response. 
 Establish a tool to evaluate the effectiveness of the public information effort. 
 
 
Post Summit Actions 
 
The summit record should be shared with key local, regional, state and federal officials 
involved in development and implementation of homeland security plans, policies and 
programs. 
 
All participants agreed that they needed to go back to their communities and share 
information gained.   
 
Participants were asked to provide a list of organizations and individuals who should be 
part of the HS network. 
 
A goal was established of reconvening the summit in the fall/winter 2002 for a day to 
revisit summit recommendations and to update participants. 
 
 
